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This paper studies trade-induced transitional dynamics by estimating a structural
dynamic equilibrium model of the labor market. The model features a multi-sector
economy with overlapping generations, heterogeneous workers, endogenous accumula-
tion of sector-speciﬁc experience and costly switching of sectors. The estimation em-
ploys a large panel of workers constructed from Brazilian matched employer-employee
data. The model’s estimates yield high average costs of mobility that are very dispersed
across the population. In addition, sector-speciﬁc experience is imperfectly transferable
across sectors, leading to additional barriers to mobility. Using the estimated model
as a laboratory for counterfactual experiments, this paper ﬁnds that: (1) there is a
large labor market response following trade liberalization but the transition may take
several years; (2) potential aggregate welfare gains are signiﬁcantly mitigated due to
the slow adjustment; (3) trade-induced welfare eﬀects are very heterogeneous across
the population; (4) retraining workers initially employed in the adversely aﬀected sec-
tor may reduce losses incurred by these workers and increase aggregate welfare; (5) a
moving subsidy that covers costs of mobility is more promising for compensating losers,
although at the expense of higher welfare adjustment costs. The experiments also high-
light the sensitivity of the transitional dynamics with respect to assumptions regarding
the mobility of physical capital.
Keywords: Trade Liberalization, Labor Market Dynamics, Adjustment Costs, Worker
Heterogeneity, Structural Econometric Models
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11 Introduction
One of the least-controversial lessons of neoclassical economics is that free trade increases
aggregate welfare by eﬃciently allocating resources within countries. However, free trade
also generates distributional conﬂicts: there will be winners and losers.
The arguments supporting aggregate welfare gains from trade are typically based on
long-run theories where only an initial state (typically autarky) and a ﬁnal state (free or less-
distorted trade) are considered, with no predictions of what happens in between. Perfect
factor mobility is usually assumed and unemployment is seldom modeled.1 On the other
hand, theories that emphasize distributional conﬂicts following trade liberalization rely on
extreme assumptions regarding factor mobility in order to identify winners and losers. For
example, in the long-run Hecksher-Ohlin model, with perfectly mobile factors, the winners
and losers are characterized by what factors they own (e.g., skilled versus unskilled labor
or labor versus capital). In the short-run Ricardo-Viner model, with immobile factors,
winners and losers are characterized by their industry aﬃliation (e.g, import-competing
versus export-oriented industries).
Meanwhile, free trade is far from being widely practiced, especially in developing coun-
tries. Even countries that implemented important trade reforms in the 1980s and 1990s,
such as Brazil, Colombia and India, still have high import tariﬀs. The existence of distri-
butional conﬂicts is indeed an important consideration limiting the adoption of free trade.
Nevertheless, a considerable source of concern for policy makers is that we still lack a good
understanding of how the economy will behave in the short-to medium-run in the aftermath
of trade liberalization. This is important in order to determine how fast the gains from
trade can be realized, and to better characterize who the winners and losers from trade
liberalization are.
Perhaps surprisingly, economists are still not in a comfortable position to answer relevant
policy questions such as: How long should we expect the labor market transition to last?
To what extent will the potential gains from trade be mitigated due to the slow adjustment
of the economy to the new free trade equilibrium? What are the characteristics of the
workers who will lose the most from trade liberalization? What labor market policies are
most promising for reducing adjustment costs, speeding up adjustment and compensating
the losers?
This paper provides a better understanding of these issues by estimating a structural
dynamic equilibrium model of the labor market. The framework adopted is closely related
1Notable exceptions are Neary (1978), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999), Helpman and Itskhoki (2009)
and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010)
2to Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006). The labor demand side is given by perfectly
competitive sector-representative ﬁrms with Cobb-Douglas production functions and three
factors - human capital from unskilled workers, human capital from skilled workers and
physical capital. The labor supply side features overlapping generations, forward looking
heterogeneous workers in several dimensions who have comparative advantage across sectors,
endogenous accumulation of sector-speciﬁc experience, self-selection into sectors based on
observable and unobservable components of wages and costly switching of sectors. Wages
(human capital prices) are determined in equilibrium.
The model includes two important margins through which the labor market can adjust
in response to trade reform. It features overlapping generations where older, possibly less-
mobile workers retire, and younger, possibly more-mobile workers choose where to work for
the ﬁrst time. This implies an important role for younger generations: that of speeding
up reallocation after trade reform. The model also includes a labor supply decision, so that
workers can decide to drop out of the formal labor market when they are hit with bad shocks.
I employ simulation methods and a large panel of workers constructed from matched
employer-employee data from Brazil in order to estimate the model. These data are par-
ticularly well suited to the analysis carried out in this paper due to the large sample size,
the ability to follow workers over time and across industries and the ability to construct
sector-speciﬁc experience for all workers.
The model’s estimates imply that workers’ costs of switching are on average large, but
these vary tremendously across individuals with diﬀerent observable characteristics (gender,
education, age). This produces a very dispersed distribution of mobility costs within the
population. Female, older and less educated workers, for example, face substantially higher
costs of switching sectors. In line with previous research (Neal (1995)), this paper ﬁnds that
sector-speciﬁc experience is imperfectly transferable across sectors, leading to additional
barriers to mobility.
The estimated model is subsequently used as a laboratory for counterfactual experiments.
In all the experiments, the price of the import-competing sector (High-Tech Manufacturing)
faces a once-and-for-all decline in order to simulate a trade liberalization episode. I focus
on this particular shock since tariﬀs in the High-Tech Manufacturing sector remained high
(both in relative and absolute terms) despite the Brazilian trade liberalization episode of
1988-1994 (see Kume, Piani and Souza (2000)).
The ﬁndings indicate that: (1) there is a large labor market response following trade
liberalization but the transition may take several years; (2) the analyses conducted highlight
that the duration and magnitude of the transition are very sensitive to assumptions regarding
the mobility of physical capital; (3) workers employed in High-Tech Manufacturing prior to
3the shock face substantial losses in welfare, especially the unskilled and the young; (4)
adjustment costs - deﬁned as the fraction of the potential gains from trade that are lost due
to the slow and costly adjustment - are substantial; (5) costs of mobility are more important
than sector-speciﬁc experience in explaining the slow adjustment of the labor market, at least
when the shock aﬀects the High-Tech Manufacturing sector; (6) retraining workers initially
employed in the adversely aﬀected sector reduces welfare losses incurred by these workers
and may increase aggregate welfare; and (7) a moving subsidy that covers switching costs is
more promising in compensating workers initially employed in the aﬀected sector, although
at the expense of higher welfare adjustment costs.
This paper contributes to the active literature that studies the impact of trade openness
on labor markets. This has been a very active area of research in recent years. From a
theoretical perspective, this literature focuses on the impact of trade openness on unem-
ployment and inequality using search and matching models (Davidson, Martin and Matusz
(1999), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010)); on how diﬀerences in labor market rigidities
matter for the pattern of comparative advantage across countries (Cuñat and Melitz (2009),
Helpman and Itskhoki (2009)); and on how to compensate losers from trade liberalization
(Davidson and Matusz (2006)). From an empirical perspective, this literature focuses on
the impact of trade on wages within heterogeneous-ﬁrms trade models (Verhoogen (2008)
and Amiti and Davis (2008)), the exporter wage premium (Frías, Kaplan and Verhoogen
(2009)) and the study of trade-induced labor market dynamics and its implications for
welfare (Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007), Kambourov (2009), Artuç, Chaudhuri and
McLaren (2010), Artuç (2009), Cosar (2010) and Cosar, Guner and Tybout (2010)).
My paper is most related to Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), Artuç (2009), and
Cosar (2010). Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) study inter-sectoral labor adjustment
within a structural dynamic model of the labor market with competitive product and factor
markets. Workers face mobility costs in order to switch sectors and are all homogeneous,
apart from idiosyncratic preference shocks for sectors. The current paper estimates a model
similar in spirit to that paper, but incorporates several important features, some of which
were shown in the literature to be crucial in explaining the inter-sectoral wage structure,
which is key for the identiﬁcation of mobility costs. For example, workers are allowed to
endogenously accumulate sector-speciﬁc experience, which may itself be an important addi-
tional barrier to mobility. In addition, the introduction of a rich set of worker heterogeneity
in my model allows for the study of how trade-induced sectoral price changes interact with
workers’ demographic characteristics such as age and education. Most importantly, my
model accounts for self-selection into sectors based on unobservable2 wage shocks and intro-
2From the econometrician’s perspective.
4duces a non-market choice. Heckman and Sedlacek (1985 and 1990) show that correcting for
self-selection into sectors based on unobservable components of wages as well as allowing for
a non-market choice to workers are crucial for explaining the inter-sectoral wage structure.
Artuç (2009) extends Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) in order to analyze how
trade reform diﬀerentially impacts older and younger workers. However, the empirical strat-
egy pursued in his paper implicitly abstracts from worker self-selection into sectors based
on unobservable components of wages.3 In addition, Artuç (2009) does not allow for a non-
market option; as I show in my paper, the presence of the non-market option has important
implications for the eﬀects of trade liberalization on young versus old workers - at least in
the Brazilian data.
Cosar (2010) studies labor adjustment following trade reform by calibrating a two-sector,
small, open-economy model with overlapping generations, labor market search and matching,
and sector-speciﬁc human capital accumulated through learning-by-doing. By simulating a
trade-induced price shock in one sector, his calibrated model predicts an extremely slow
adjustment of the labor market. Cosar then shows that the main factor accounting for
the slow adjustment is sector-speciﬁc experience. However, in his model, sector-speciﬁc
experience is not transferable across sectors. Workers who switch sectors start their new jobs
with no sector-speciﬁc experience. The type of labor market models we study diﬀer in several
dimensions, but more importantly, the model in my paper allows for sector-speciﬁc experience
to be transferable across sectors, though imperfectly, with the degree of transferability being
estimated based on the Brazilian data. My results suggest much faster adjustment and a
much smaller inﬂuence of sector-speciﬁc experience on the speed of adjustment. Finally,
Cosar also uses his model in order to assess the distributional and eﬃciency properties
of diﬀerent labor market policies following trade reform. The model in my paper does not
feature the externalities emphasized in Cosar’s, therefore our analyses regarding labor market
policies should be seen as complementary.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I outline the model. Section 3 describes
the data used in the estimation. Section 4 provides a detailed presentation of the estimation
procedure. In Section 5, I present and discuss the estimation results. Section 6 presents the
description and analysis of the counterfactual experiments. Finally, I conclude in Section 7.
3In the actual model presented in Artuç (2009), workers do self-select into sectors based on unobservable
shocks in wages. However, these selection eﬀects are not taken into account in the derivation of a key
equation of the paper, on which the empirical strategy is based. If one takes into account self-selection based
on unobservables, one loses the closed form solution for equilibrium wages, so that the empirical strategy
pursued in the paper must be redesigned.
52 Model
The framework in this paper is closely related to papers by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985),
Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006). In short, it is an equilibrium dynamic version of the
Roy Model (Roy (1951), Heckman and Honoré (1990)). The economy is divided into four
productive sectors and a non-productive Residual Sector, indexed as follows: (0) Residual
Sector; (1) Agriculture and Mining (Primary); (2) Low-Tech Manufacturing; (3) High-Tech
Manufacturing; and (4) Non-Tradeables.
For the time being, let us think of the Residual Sector as home production or an "out of
the labor force" decision. In fact, home production is only one component of the Residual
Sector, but I postpone a detailed deﬁnition of the Residual Sector to the next section, when
I present and discuss the data.
The production side of the model has sector-representative ﬁrms. Factors of production
are human capital from unskilled (of lower educational achievement) workers, human cap-
ital from skilled (of higher educational achievement) workers and physical capital. Firms’
decisions yield the demand for each type of human capital in each sector.
The human capital supply side has forward-looking heterogeneous workers supplying
human capital to the sector-representative ﬁrms. Workers have comparative advantage: the
amount of human capital they can supply diﬀer across sectors. For example, a worker can be
better in shoe making than she is in car making or vice versa. However, a worker can supply
human capital to one sector at the most. Sector-speciﬁc human capital has a deterministic
component that depends on individual characteristics such as education, age and sector-
speciﬁc experience, but also depends on an idiosyncratic shock. At each period, a worker
draws new idiosyncratic shocks for the amount of human capital she can supply to each
sector, and chooses to work in the sector in which her present value utility is maximized. If
the worker decides to work in a diﬀerent sector than that of the last period, a switching cost
must be incurred. Finally, new generations come to the labor market and old generations
retire each year. The decisions of individual workers aggregate to the supply of human
capital for each sector. Human capital prices are determined in equilibrium - they equate
aggregate demand to aggregate supply of each type of human capital in each sector.
62.1 Production
Production is undertaken by sector level representative ﬁrms with Cobb-Douglas production





























t is the price of output of sector s at time t; As
t is the productivity of sector s
at time t; H
0,s
t is the aggregate human capital employed in sector s at time t coming from
unskilled workers; H
1,s
t is the aggregate human capital employed in sector s at time t coming
from skilled workers; and Ks
t is the aggregate physical capital employed in sector s at time
t.
Firms act competitively, and hence demand for the two types of human capital and



































t is the price of one unit of human capital in sector s at time t coming from
unskilled workers; r
1,s
t is the price of one unit of human capital in sector s at time t coming
from skilled workers; and r
K,s
t is the rental price of one unit of physical capital in sector s.
This rental price can diﬀer across sectors, depending on what assumptions are made about
the mobility of physical capital.
In (1) unskilled and skilled human capital are complementary in order to allow trade









Workers have instantaneous utility ﬂow given by:5
4The emphasis on value added is based on available data from the Brazilian National Accounts.
5The Cobb-Douglas utility function for consumption is convenient since it implies that decisions regarding
which sector to work in does not depend on relative prices, only on relative real wages and the value of the
Residual Sector.
7U (s0,s1,C) = w










Where s0 is the sector chosen in the previous period; s1 is the sector chosen in the current
period; C =(C1,C2,C3,C4) is the vector of consumption; I(.) is an indicator function; w0




µk = 1; and Costs0s1 is the disutility of switching from sector s0 to sector s1.
A worker chooses in which sector to work at age a and how much to consume in order to
maximize the expected present value of her utility. There is no saving nor borrowing. Wages
that are received when a worker is of age a must be totally consumed in that year. If the
worker chooses the Residual Sector, she receives no wages and hence cannot consume any
produced goods. For the time being, it can be thought of as the worker enjoying leisure and
receiving utility w0 from it. The only way of enjoying utility from leisure in the model is by
choosing the Residual Sector.
Workers enter the labor market at age 25 and retire at age 60.6
















τd(j = sτ)∀τ = a,...,A
(4)
Where ρ is the discount factor; ws
τ is the nominal wage oﬀer from sector s to the worker
when she is of age τ; ps
τ is the price of sector s output when the worker has age τ.



























And then choosing the optimal consumption basket at each point in time.
6RAIS, the dataset used in this paper and introduced in the next section, only includes information on
individuals who have worked at least once in the formal sector. Information on educational decisions is not
available. For this reason, the model has workers starting at age 25, since at that age educational decisions






















is the real wage
the worker would receive would she choose to work in sector s at age τ. From now on, all
variables will be expressed in real terms.
I now model each component of equation (5). Variables will be indexed as follows: i:
individual; a: age; s: sector; t: time (year); and skill(i): skill level of individual i. Skill level
can take the values 0 or 1 (unskilled or skilled).
The level of education is divided in four categories as follows: (1) From Illiterate to
Primary School Graduate; (2) From Some Middle School to Some High School; (3) High
School Graduate; (4) At Least Some College.
Worker i is labeled skilled (skill(i) = 1) if she has education level 3 or 4 (high school
graduate or higher) and unskilled (skill(i) = 0) otherwise (less than high school).
2.2.1 Wages
Wages are modeled in the same way as in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Lee (2005) and
Lee and Wolpin (2006). This speciﬁcation for wages has been referred to, in the Labor
Economics literature, as the Ben-Porath-Griliches speciﬁcation of the wage function.7 In the
International Trade literature, this speciﬁcation was used by Ohnsorge and Treﬂer (2007).
The wage ws
iat in sector s oﬀered to worker i of age a at time t is given by the price of














iat if skill(i) = 1
(6)
The amount of human capital worker i of age a at time t can supply to sector s depends
on characteristics such as gender and education dummies, age and sector-speciﬁc experience
accumulated in each of the four productive sectors up to time t−1 (Experikt for k = 1,...,4).
It also depends on an idiosyncratic component εs
it, which is unobserved by the econometrician,
7See Griliches (1977) and Willis (1986).








2I (Educi = 2) + βs
4(a − 25)+
βs















3I (Educi = 4) + βs
4(a − 25)+
βs








The parameter vector β
s is the same for both types of human capital. I allow for work-
ers within a speciﬁc level of skill but with a higher education level to be more productive,
everything else equal. For example, everything else equal, within skill level 0, workers with
education level 2 are more productive than workers with education level 1. The only diﬀer-
ence between the two equations in (7) is in the education coeﬃcient: βs
2 for the unskilled
workers and βs
3 for the skilled workers.
It is important to call attention to the fact that the human capital production functions
in (7) allow for skills acquired in sector i to be transferable to sector j. The degree of
transferability is given by the parameters βs
6 to βs
9 and will be estimated.
Note that the human capital production functions do not have intercepts. We cannot
separately identify the intercepts in the human capital production functions and the level of
the human capital prices. Consequently, I normalize the human capital intercepts to zero.
2.2.2 Value of the Residual Sector
The value of the Residual Sector w0
iat for worker i of age a at time t depends on her observable
characteristics (gender and education dummies, age) and on an idiosyncratic component ε0
it,





 γ0 + γ1Femalei +
4  
l=2
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The value of the Residual Sector is not observed in the data, but can be estimated using
information on wages in the diﬀerent sectors, on the fraction of workers who choose the
Residual Sector and transition rates in and out of that sector. More details on identiﬁcation
are provided in Section 4.2.
Finally, the vector of idiosyncratic shocks (εit) for the productive and Residual Sectors
10are independent across i and t and drawn from a normal distribution.8
εit ∼ N (0,Σ)
Where Σ is a diagonal matrix.
It is convenient to note that the model has two sources of mobility across sectors. First,
workers face sector-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks in their sector-speciﬁc human capital pro-
duction functions and that generates two-way ﬂows: from sector i to sector j and from sector
j to sector i. Second, variation in the human capital prices will make sectors more or less
attractive to all workers, leading to net ﬂows between sectors. These two features of the
model will generate gross ﬂows in excess of net ﬂows, which is a stylized fact emphasized
by Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) and which is also present in the data used in the
current paper (see next Section).
2.2.3 Costs of switching sectors (mobility costs)
The costs of switching sectors, or mobility costs, for worker i of age a are given by equation







 ϕss′ + κ1Femalei +
4  
l=2
κlI (Educi = l)+
κ5(a − 25) + κ6(a − 25)2

 s  = s
′, s
′  = 0 (9)
Cost
ss′
ia = 0 s = s
′, s
′ = 0
Since in the model costs of switching sectors are utility costs, the interpretation of these
costs is that workers have a preference for the status quo and/or face psychological costs
when switching sectors. These costs may also capture other barriers to mobility that are
not included in the model such as geographic mobility costs, search and matching frictions,
and/or ﬁrms’ ﬁring and hiring costs (see Kambourov (2009)).9
Intuitively, the costs of switching are a measure for the inability of workers to arbitrage
wage diﬀerentials away. Consider a two-sector economy and suppose worker i is initially
working in sector 1. Suppose further that, for worker i, the expected present value of
8A version of the paper where the unobservable component of wages and value of the Residual Sector εit
has both a ﬁxed and a time varying component is under preparation.
9A micro-foundation study of these costs is an important avenue for future research. In this paper costs
of mobility should be interpreted purely as a measure of workers’ inability to arbitrage wage diﬀerentials.
It is revealed using information on wage diﬀerentials, transition rates and the structure of the model. More
details on identiﬁcation will be provided in Section 4.2
11working in sector 2 is higher than the expected presented value of working in sector 1 - that
is, Vi,2 > Vi,1. The cost of switching sector 1 for 2 for worker i is given by the diﬀerence
Vi,2 − Vi,1 which makes her indiﬀerent to move. When computing Vi,1 and Vi,2, the worker
knows that by moving from sector 1 to sector 2, her sector 1-speciﬁc experience is not going
to be fully transferable to her human capital in sector 2 and takes that into account.
It is important to notice that the model features two distinct sources of barriers to
mobility. One works directly through direct wage eﬀects of moving: sector-speciﬁc experience
is not fully transferable across sectors.10 The other works through the inability of arbitraging
wage diﬀerentials, taking sector-speciﬁc experience into account, i.e., mobility costs.
2.2.4 Expectations
In order to choose where to work at age a and time t, a worker must form expectations on
future wage oﬀers and on future values for the Residual Sector (see equation (5)). I adopt
a simplifying assumption regarding how workers form expectations regarding future human
capital prices. Workers are assumed to behave myopically in the sense that they think that
the equilibrium human capital prices that are formed at time t, will persist forever, with no
uncertainty. At time t + 1, new equilibrium human capital prices are formed and at this
point, workers think these newly formed prices will persist forever, and so on.
In principle, it would be possible to make more sophisticated assumptions regarding
expectations. One could impose expectations in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998),
where workers use only a few moments in order to form expectations about the future,
but these expectations must be consistent with the outcomes produced by the model. A
version of this approach was developed by Lee and Wolpin (2006), where they imposed that
workers predict future human capital prices using a VAR relating current human capital
prices to current sectoral prices, past human capital prices and past physical capital rental
prices. The VAR, used by the workers in order to make predictions about the future, was
imposed to be consistent with the stochastic process for human capital prices generated by
the model. This would be a desirable benchmark for this paper. The obstacle for following
this route is that I use only 11 years of data in order to estimate the model, and a simple
VAR with only current human capital prices would have more parameters than data points.
Even by imposing structure on the VAR, we would be left with very few degrees of freedom.
Moreover, the ﬁxed point computation necessary to make expectations consistent with the
model outcome makes estimation much more expensive.
Consequently, given myopic expectations, expectations in (5) are computed only with
respect to future idiosyncratic shocks, which are unknown at the time the sectoral decision
10This is what the data actually reveal, see Section 5.
12is made.
2.2.5 Bellman Equation
The state space Ωiat of worker i of age a at time t is given by all variables that are relevant
for the determination of the current value of the Residual Sector, the real wage the worker
would get in any of the productive sectors, the costs that must be incurred when switching
sectors and any other variable relevant for the formation of expectations. Given the myopic
assumption on expectations, these include: gender, level of education, history of sectors of
activity, current real human capital prices and current idiosyncratic shocks.
Ωiat =



















if skill(i) = 1
(10)
Note that I have included in Ωiat the history of sectors of activity only up to 9 lags
(di,t−9,...,di,t−1). I assume that only experience accumulated in a window of 9 years is relevant
for the determination of human capital. The reason behind this assumption comes from data
limitations. The sample used in estimation starts with data for 1995. The data from 1986 to
1994 (i.e, 9 lags) are used in order to construct workers’ sector-speciﬁc experience variables
in 1995 or when they ﬁrst enter the sample. In other words, the data from 1986 to 1994 are
used in order to construct workers’ initial conditions.
The Bellman Equations for problem (5) is given below by equations (11)-(12).









t − Cost(sa−1,t−1)s + ρEVa+1 (Ωa+1,t+1|Ωat,dt = s) for a < 60
ws
t − Cost(sa−1,t−1)s for a = 60
(12)
s = 0,1,...,4
2.2.6 Aggregate Supply of Human Capital
Workers solve the Bellman Equations (11)-(12) in order to decide what sector to choose at
each age a and period t. Let ds (Ωiat) be an indicator variable for whether a worker with
13state Ωiat chooses sector s.
d
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0,s
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I (skill(i) = 1)h
1,s
iatd
s (Ωiat) s = 1,...,4
Where Nat is the size of cohort born at t −a, and   Ωt is the collection of all active (25 to
60 years old) workers’ state spaces at time t, excluding human capital prices.
2.3 Labor Market Equilibrium





k=1 (which is observed data from
the Brazilian National Accounts and will be ﬁxed throughout the estimation),

































































(which are all observed data) with equality.
At this point, it is important to note that given the Cobb-Douglas production functions
and the assumptions made on how workers form expectations, we do not need to make
any assumptions about the mobility of physical capital in order to estimate the
parameters of the model.
Given parameter values for the human capital production functions, value of the Residual
Sector and for the costs of switching functions, we can compute human capital demand (right
hand side of equation (15)) and human capital supply (left hand side of equation (15)) by
simulating the model, and solving for the equilibrium human capital prices without the need
for physical capital rental prices.






k=1, and given the assumptions on expectations, I do not need to recover neither
the prices ps
t nor the productivity terms As
t. Second, not only do we not have to make
assumptions regarding the mobility of physical capital, but also I do not need to model
how physical capital is being accumulated. Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption on the
production functions and the assumptions on expectations, all the information about the






Additional structure on the model will have to be imposed when I implement the coun-
terfactual experiments, but I postpone these details to Section 6.
3 Data
3.1 A Panel of Workers (1995 to 2005)
The data used in this paper comes from the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a
matched employer-employee dataset assembled by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor every year
since 1986. Each year the universe of Brazilian ﬁrms are required by law to ﬁle information
about both the ﬁrm as well as about each of its employees to the Ministry of Labor. These
data are collected in order to fulﬁll two main objectives: (1) for the government to generate
statistics about the labor market; and (2) to serve as the main source of information on
whether a certain employee is eligible to receive the abono salarial, which consists of one
extra minimum yearly wage payment provided by the government.
The data consist of job entries identiﬁed by both a worker ID number (PIS) and a ﬁrm-
plant registration number (CNPJ). These identiﬁers are unique and do not change over time,
which allow us to track workers over time and across ﬁrms and plants. Each job entry comes
with information regarding the ﬁrm-plant pair where the worker was employed. There is
information on geographic location, 5-digit level NAICS industry, capital ownership and
other variables. At the worker level, we have information on gender, age, level of education,
monthly wage, number of hours in the contract, tenure at the ﬁrm, occupation, month of
accession into the job (if accession occurred during the current year), month of separation
(if any) and other variables.
In order to track workers over time and across sectors, and in order to construct sector-
speciﬁc experience variables, I constructed a panel of workers by ﬁrst listing all the identiﬁers
that appear in the data between 1995 and 2005. I then selected a random sample of 1%
of distinct worker ID numbers at random (approximately 600,000 workers). These are the
individuals that are followed in the panel. Since RAIS has data available since 1986, I used
the observations from 1986 to 1994 in order to construct the experience variables that will
15enter the initial conditions used in the simulation as well as in the estimation of the auxiliary
models used for the estimation of the structural parameters. If I did not use the years 1986
to 1994, I would not be able to recover the experience variables of individuals who ﬁrst enter
the constructed panel in 1995.
Since the model assumes that a worker can supply her skills to a single sector (job) each
year, I select a single job entry for each worker in each year. If a worker has multiple jobs in
a given year, the job with highest hourly wage is selected. Hourly wages are computed by
dividing the monthly wage by the number of hours in the contract. In this paper wages are
actually hourly wages, since in the context of the model there is no full-or part-time decision
and all workers are assumed to work full-time.
Since this is a census of the Brazilian formal labor market only, we lose track of workers
who do not hold a job in the formal sector in a given year. In a given year, we are unable to
observe a worker in RAIS if she is unemployed, out of the labor force, informally employed
or even self-employed. Because workers’ ID numbers are unique, we can keep tracking her
once she returns to a job in the formal sector. Consequently, movements in and out of the
data set are quite frequent and for a large portion of workers. In order to accommodate
this feature of the data, I included a Residual Sector into the model, which represents the
complement of formal sector employment. Transitions to the Residual Sector are rational
and voluntary, as outlined in the model.
The advantages of using such data are threefold. First, we have the ability to construct a
panel of workers and track them over time and across sectors. Second, by using past rounds
of the data, we can recover initial conditions (sector-speciﬁc experience) for all workers,
which allows us to control for them in the estimation. Third, we have a very large sample
size, which will lead to high precision in the estimates.
3.2 Aggregate Data
Using the Brazilian National Accounts, it was possible to construct value added series for
each of the aggregate sectors used in this paper. Although data on the rental price of physical
capital is not used in the estimation procedure, I will need these when I simulate the model.
Aggregate capital stock series were constructed in Morandi (2004) and are available for
download at www.ipeadata.br. Unfortunately, there are no available series that would allow
for the construction of capital stock series at the industry level. Economy-wide returns to
capital were calculated as: rK
t =
Capital Share×V alue Addedt
Capital Stockt .
Although the Brazilian National Accounts provide information on the economy-wide
wage bill, the labor share calculated as
Wage Bill
V alue Added ﬂuctuates at around 0.4. Gollin (2002)
16suggests that the labor income that comes from National Accounts are most likely to be badly
downward biased since they fail to correctly take into account the incomes of self-employed
or informal workers. By correcting for self-employment he ﬁnds that among the countries
he studies, he is able to reduce the dispersion of wage bill shares from 0.05-0.8 to 0.65-0.8.
I follow this advice and impose that the economy-wide wage bill share in Brazil is equal to
0.65 and constant over time. Hence, the physical capital share used in the calculation of
returns to capital is calibrated at 0.35.
In order to get sector-speciﬁc wage bill shares, the relative sectoral wage bill shares are
ﬁxed as in the data and are inﬂated so that the economy-wide wage bill equals 0.65 times
Value Added.
All quantities are expressed in terms of 2005 R$ by deﬂating the nominal quantities using
the Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor (INPC).
3.3 Some Features of the Data
The four (productive) aggregate sectors used in this paper are: 1) Agriculture and Mining; 2)
Low-Tech Manufacturing; 3) High-Tech Manufacturing and 4) Non-Tradeables. In principle,
the model allows for a much ﬁner partition of the economy, but increasing the number of
sectors will quickly make the estimation of the model computationally infeasible.
This paper focuses on inter-sectoral reallocation following a trade shock, and it is natural
to separate the manufacturing sector into Low-Tech - a sector in which Brazil has a com-
parative advantage due to its abundance of low-skilled workers - and High-Tech - a sector in
which Brazil has a comparative disadvantage and where import tariﬀs are higher during the
sample period (1995 to 2005), see Kume, Piani and Souza (2000). Agriculture and Mining
is also an important export-oriented sector in Brazil.
The division of Manufacturing into Low and High-Tech was based on the OECD Science
Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2001 report "Towards a Knowledge Based Economy."
In this report, the OECD classiﬁes industries according to their technology intensity. I
classiﬁed as Non-Tradeables all the sectors with 2-digit NAICS classiﬁcation greater than
or equal to 40, which include the following broadly-deﬁned sectors: Retail and Wholesale
Trade, Utilities, Transportation, Government and Services. Table 1 details how the 2-digit
NAICS industries were separated into the four aggregate sectors this paper works with.
Figure 1 shows the employment shares across these four sectors. The shares of Agriculture
and Mining vary between 5% and 6%, High Tech Manufacturing between 4% and 6%, Low-
Tech Manufacturing between 14% and 16% and Non-Tradeables between 74% and 76%. A
closer look at these shares reveals that their importance has changed over time. Figure 2
17plots the changes in relative importance of each of these sectors over time. In other words,
it plots
employment sharet − employment share1995
employment share1995
We can see that the Agriculture/Mining and Non-Tradeables sectors have gained impor-
tance between 1995 and 2005, whereas the opposite happened to both manufacturing sectors.
Hence, Figure 2 shows that there appears to be some reallocation taking place between these
four sectors during the sample period, possibly due to the slow response to both the trade
reform implemented in 1990 and Mercosur.
Table 2 presents median hourly wages in the overall economy as well as in each of the
four sectors in terms of 2005 R$.11
Table 3 shows the matrix of yearly ﬂows from 1995 to 2005, averaged out. The matrix
shows that, although net ﬂows between sectors do not appear to be that large in Figure
1, gross ﬂows are quite important, with a mass of workers entering and leaving the same
sectors. We can also see the importance of the Residual Sector, with important ﬂows into this
sector coming from all other sectors. Transitions to the Residual Sector are most frequent
if a worker comes from Agriculture and Mining, with 17% of workers in that sector going to
the Residual Sector every year. The productive sector that appears to receive larger inﬂows
of workers is the Non-Tradeables sector, but this is also the largest sector. What is also
important to observe from this matrix is the high persistence in the sector of origin. The
diagonal of the matrix has numbers between 75% and 86%, suggesting both the importance
of sector-speciﬁc experience as well as costs of switching sectors, key ingredients in the model
outlined in the previous section.
In order to have an idea of how wage diﬀerentials have evolved over the sample periods,
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dikt is a dummy indicating whether worker i is at sector k at period t. Figure 3 plots





k, where empkt is the em-
ployment share of sector k at year t. There are three things to note. First, there is a
11The average exchange rate between the Brazilian Real (R$) and the US Dollar (US$) was 2.43 R$/US$
in 2005.
18considerable dispersion in wage diﬀerentials, with High-Tech paying the most and Agricul-
ture/Mining paying the least, even after controlling for observables. Second, this dispersion
has decreased between 1995 and 2005, mainly due to an upward trend in relative wages in
Agriculture/Mining and a downward trend in relative wages in High-Tech Manufacturing.
Third, there is very little volatility of wage diﬀerentials, at least around the trends.
Given the third observation above, introducing uncertainty in the way workers form
expectations is unlikely to produce signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results, given the low volatility
of wage diﬀerentials in the data. A seemingly more important modiﬁcation of the myopic
assumption employed in this paper, would be to allow for trends in the human capital prices.
However, it is unclear how one would proceed with this route, especially when one conducts
the counterfactual simulations.
4 Estimation
In this Section, I outline the Indirect Inference12 method that was used in the estimation.
Moreover, I discuss what features of the data will be used in the Indirect Inference esti-
mation procedure, the so-called "auxiliary models". Finally, I discuss how the model is
econometrically identiﬁed.
4.1 Indirect Inference
The estimation method that will be employed in this paper is Indirect Inference (Gouriéroux
and Monfort (1996)). In this method, we ﬁrst choose a set of auxiliary models that provide
a detailed statistical description of the data. The objective of these auxiliary models is
to attempt to capture as much information as possible concerning moments and statistical
relationships the researcher believes are important to be matched by the structural model.
It is also important that the choice of auxiliary models allows for the structural parameters
to be identiﬁed. More details on identiﬁcation and the selection of the auxiliary models are
provided in Section 4.2.
Here is how I proceed with the estimation.
1. Obtain the time varying human capital shares αs
t using the skill level speciﬁc wage bills
and value added Y s
t for each sector s = 1,...,4. Remember that I impose the economy-wide
skill share to be equal to 0.65, so the total wage bill must be corrected upwards.
12I opted to use Indirect Inference in this paper because the likelihood function does not have a closed-form
solution. Consequently, for each individual in the sample, 5-dimensional integrals without closed form must
be numerically computed for each guess of the parameter set, making maximum likelihood computationally
much more demanding than Indirect Inference.
192. Impose the inter-temporal discount factor to ρ = 0.95.
3. Estimate the auxiliary models with data from the panel of workers. Let   δ denote
the estimates of these models all stacked up in a single vector. This vector will be ﬁxed
throughout the estimation procedure.
4. Extract initial conditions from the panel of workers. The initial conditions consist of
the empirical joint distribution of age, gender, education level and sector-speciﬁc experiences
as found in the data. In 1995, I will have initial conditions for individuals aged 25 to 60
years old and after that, from 1996 to 2005, I will only have initial conditions for entering
generations at the age of 25 (the age of labor market entry in the model). 1,000 individuals
for each cohort and skill level (skilled or unskilled) are sampled from the data, and adequately
weighted by the size of their corresponding cohort and skill level. These are the individuals
who will be used for simulating the model.
Steps 5 to 9 are embedded in an optimization routine.
5. Given a set of structural parameters Θ, solve the Bellman equations, that is, compute
the EVa(.) functions in (12) for each age a at each point of the state space. Appendix A
gives the details on how the Bellman equations are solved.
6. For t = 1995,...,2005 compute, by simulating the economy parametrized by Θ, the
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s = 1,...,4 (20)
Where Nskill
at is the relative size of cohort with age a at year t and skill level skill, and
ds is a dummy for whether sector s is chosen, as function of the state variables.   Ωiat is the
state space of individual i of age a at time t, excluding the human capital prices.
The economy is simulated by sequentially drawing the individual idiosyncratic shocks
20and computing the equilibrium human capital prices.
7. Estimate the auxiliary models with the data that is simulated in step 6. Let   δS (Θ)
denote the estimates of these models stacked up.
8. Compute the Indirect Inference loss function:
Q(Θ) =
 









Q(Θ) is a measure of the distance between   δ and   δS (Θ). Ω is a positive deﬁnite weighting
matrix.
9. Use an optimization routine to guess a new set of structural parameters Θ and go
back to 5 until Q is minimized.
The procedure described above is illustrated in Figure 4.
The Indirect Inference method is very similar to the Simulated Method of Moments.
Suppose we had a single auxiliary model, y = Xβ +ε and let the weighting matrix be X
′X.
The Indirect Inference loss function becomes:
Q(Θ) =
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  E [y|X] −   E [y (Θ)|X]
 ′  
  E [y|X] −   E [y (Θ)|X]
 
Where   E denotes the best linear predictor operator and y (Θ) is the data generated by
the model under parameter Θ.
In that case, Indirect Inference matches best linear predictors.
4.2 Auxiliary Models and Identiﬁcation
In constructing the Indirect Inference estimator, the researcher must choose auxiliary models
that describe statistical relationships the researcher thinks her model should be able to
reproduce. These models should be relatively simple and quick to estimate and are usually
misspeciﬁed. They should also provide a suﬃciently rich description of the data in order to
allow the model to be identiﬁed.
In this paper, the statistical relationships that I will consider important to be generated by
the model are (1) how wages vary over time and how they are correlated with observables,
such as gender, education, age and sector-speciﬁc experiences; (2) wage dispersion after
controlling for observable workers’ characteristics; (3) how sectoral choices vary over time
and how they are correlated with observable characteristics; (4) how transition rates between
21sectors vary over time and how they correlate with observable characteristics.
The auxiliary models used in the computation of Q are described below:
Coeﬃcient
Auxiliary Model Fit to Actual Data Fit to Simulated Data
Log wage linear regressions for






Linear probability models for sectoral
choices for each sector k = 0,...,4
  γk  
  γk S (Θ)
Linear probability models for
transition rates for every pair
of sectors j,k = 0,...,4
  ϕjk  
  ϕjk S (Θ)
The same regressors are used for all auxiliary models: year dummies, gender and educa-
tion dummies, age, age squared and sector-speciﬁc experience in each of the four sectors.
The log wage auxiliary models are misspeciﬁed due to the presence of self-selection based
on unobservable components of wages. However, the model should be able to generate the
same correlation pattern between wages and workers’ characteristics than the ones found in
the data. Due to the complexity of the model and its lack of analytical solution, it is not
possible to make a purely constructive argument for identiﬁcation. However, it is possible
to give some intuition on why the structural parameters are identiﬁed.
First, consider the human capital production functions’ parameters. Self-selection is
fully taken into account and hence following Heckman (1979), the wage equation parameters
should be identiﬁed by both an exclusion restriction and the functional form assumption on
the idiosyncratic terms.13 The exclusion restriction here is the sector where a worker was
active in the previous period: this variable matters for the current decision of the worker,
but does not enter the wage equations, after we control for the sector-speciﬁc experience
variables. The dispersion of the idiosyncratic shocks ε is pinned down by sector-speciﬁc
wage dispersion. That is, the volatility of the human capital shocks should map to the
volatility of accepted oﬀers.
The linear probability models for the decision of where to work (including the Residual
Sector) help in the identiﬁcation of the wage parameters, but are also crucial in identifying
the parameters of the value of Residual Sector. Fixing the parameters of the wage equation,
the "employment rates" of sectors j = 0,...,4, conditioned on characteristics, identify the
value of the Residual sector parameters.
13When the model has an exclusion restriction, the normal functional form assumption is not necessary
to ensure identiﬁcation.
22Finally, the linear probability models for transition rates help to pin down the parameters
in the costs of mobility function, once the wage parameters (including the volatility of the
skill shocks) are ﬁxed. These models, especially the ones where k = 0 or j = 0, also help to
identify the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks that enter the value of the Residual Sector.
The Indirect Inference loss function Q(Θ) is computed as:
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, \ V (  γk) and \ V (  ϕk) are the OLS variances under homoskedasticity and hence take















if s = 0 (25)
That is, switching costs do not depend on the sector of origin s, unless the worker is
coming from the Residual Sector. The original idea was to ﬁx ϕss′
= ϕs′
regardless of the
sector of origin s. However, because movements in and out of the Residual Sector are very
23frequent, the model must assign a high variance to the idiosyncratic shock in the value of
the Residual Sector. Consequently, in order to match the transition rates from the Residual
Sector, the model must assign a higher cost of switching if a worker is coming from the
Residual Sector.
The parameter estimates can be found in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Appendix B describes how
standard errors were computed.
Table 4 shows the human capital production functions’ estimated parameters. There
are two types of human capital (unskilled and skilled) but they share the same parameters.
The only diﬀerence between these human capital production functions is that among the
unskilled workers the education dummy is (Educ = 2) and among the skilled workers it is
(Educ = 4).
The sector-speciﬁc experience coeﬃcients indicate that sector-speciﬁc experience accu-
mulated in sector i is usually transferable to sector j  = i. That is, when workers switch
sectors, not all experience is lost. However, sector-speciﬁc experience accumulated in sector
i is not fully transferable to sector j, which creates direct wage costs in switching
sectors. Nevertheless, this result also shows that models that assume the complete loss of
sector-speciﬁc experience when switching sectors overstate this barrier to mobility.
Experience accumulated in High-Tech Manufacturing (Exper3) is quite transferable to all
the sectors. However, experience accumulated in Agriculture and Mining (Exper1) seems to
be transferable only to Low-Tech Manufacturing. It can even hurt productivity in High-Tech
Manufacturing, although this result might be due to an unobservable compositional eﬀect
that is not present in the model: there might be a permanent and unobservable component in
the human capital production functions of workers who self-select into Agriculture/Mining
that prevents them from moving to High-Tech Manufacturing. Experience accumulated
in Low-Tech Manufacturing (Exper2) is only marginally useful in other sectors. Finally,
experience accumulated in the Non-Tradeables (Exper4) sector appears to contribute to
productivity only in Low-Tech Manufacturing.
It is interesting to note that on average, male, more educated and older workers all attach
higher values to the Residual Sector. Hence, these observable characteristics, all else equal,
lead to higher reservation wages. The standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks for the value
of the Residual Sector (in Table 5) is large, in the order of ﬁve times median annual wages.
This high volatility is necessary for the model to be able to match frequent transitions in
and out of the formal sector.
In order to interpret the magnitudes of the costs of mobility (whose parameters are shown
in Table 6), for each worker i in the data set, I express individual costs of mobility in terms of
24annual average wages, conditional on worker i’s characteristics.14 Table 7 shows the median
of costs of mobility, expressed as multiples of conditional annual average wages. For workers
currently employed in the formal sector, median costs of mobility into Agriculture/Mining are
equal to 0.68 times annual average wages, but costs of mobility into High-Tech Manufacturing
are much higher and equal to 3.25 conditional annual average wages. Costs of mobility into
Low-Tech Manufacturing and Non-Tradeables are in between and equal to 1.5 and 2.15 times
conditional annual average wages respectively.
These numbers appear very high. However, given that workers choose sectors comparing
the present value of each sector, a better way to express costs of mobility is in terms of the
present value of staying in the current sector. In this metric, median costs of mobility toward
Agriculture/Mining equal 3% of the present value of staying in the current sector and the
median costs of mobility toward High-Tech Manufacturing is equal 13%.
In order to interpret these numbers, suppose that an economy has two sectors initially
oﬀering the same wages to workers with the same characteristics. If a shock increases wages
in sector 2 by 13%, and workers perceive this increase as permanent, then half of the workers
in sector 1 would switch sectors (not considering equilibrium eﬀects).
The costs of mobility from the Residual Sector are less interpretable. These costs are
extremely high, since the model must assign a very high variance of the shocks in the value
of the Residual Sector in order to explain the frequent movements in and out of the formal
sector.
Table 8 shows regressions of costs of mobility in terms of conditional annual average
wages on various workers’ characteristics. We can see that individual costs of switching, in
terms of annual average wages, is higher for less-educated workers, women and older workers.
These are the least-mobile workers in the economy.
Finally, Figure 6 shows how dispersed these costs of mobility are, by plotting the non-
parametric densities of these costs. These costs are dispersed only because they depend on
workers’ characteristics. There is considerable variability in workers’ abilities to arbitrage
wage diﬀerentials, and this is explained by their demographic characteristics.
It is worth noting, at this point, that the magnitude of costs of mobility is model de-
pendent. Transition rates depend on wage diﬀerentials between sectors but also on the ratio
between the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks and costs of mobility. High variance in the
idiosyncratic shocks must be accompanied by high costs of mobility in order to match the
14The cost of mobility of worker i in sector s toward sector s′, expressed in terms of conditional annual






exp( b E[log(w)|Xi]), where Costss
′
(Xi) is the cost individual i with charac-
teristics Xi will incur if she switches from sector s to sector s′ and   E [log(w)|Xi] is worker’s i best linear
predictor for his log wage, unconditional on sector.
25transition rates in the data. If the model is extended in order to allow for permanent un-
observable heterogeneity, for example, the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks will naturally
decrease, leading to smaller costs of mobility.15 On the other hand, the dispersion on these
mobility costs is a more general result, and that should be emphasized.
5.2 Goodness of Fit
I now discuss how well the model ﬁts the features of the data used in the estimation.
In light of equation (22), I plot:
Figure 7 -   E [log(ws











for all workers in sector s at time
t.
Figure 8 -   E [ds











for all workers in the data set. ds
it is a
dummy for whether worker i chose sector s at time t.
















for all the workers in sector s at time
t − 1. dss′
it is a dummy for whether worker i switched from sector s to s′ from t − 1 to t.
Xit is a vector of characteristics for worker i in period t: year dummies, gender and edu-
cation dummies, age, age squared and sector-speciﬁc experience in each of the four sectors.
The distribution of X is comes from the data.   Θ is the vector of estimated parameters.
In other words, Figures 7, 8 and 9 plot the best linear predictors in the data versus the
best linear predictors generated by the model at the estimated parameter value. Each point
in each ﬁgure corresponds to an observation Xit in the data. A perfect model ﬁt would lead
to all points on top of the 45◦ line. The model performs reasonably well in explaining the
best linear predictors of log wages, sectoral choices and transition rates.
Tables 9, 10 and 11 compare unconditional wage, sectoral choice and transition rate
moments in the data and those generated by the model. The model reproduces the uncon-
ditional moments remarkably well. Appendix C shows how well the model ﬁts additional
features of the data which were not imposed in the estimation.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, I use the model as a laboratory in order to analyze the dynamics of the
labor market following a counterfactual trade liberalization episode. I focus on the following
issues:
15This illustrates the importance of counterfactual experiments in understanding the dynamics of the labor
market.
261. Quantify the speed of adjustment with which the labor market readjusts as a response
to trade liberalization.
2. Investigate the impact of assumptions regarding the mobility of physical capital on
the transition path.
3. Quantify welfare losses for workers initially employed in the adversely aﬀected sector,
and determine how these losses correlate with demographic characteristics.
4. Quantify adjustment costs: how much of the present value of gains from trade liberal-
ization is lost due to the slow labor market adjustment when compared to an economy that
adjusts immediately and with no costs to the new steady state?
5. Attempt to quantify the relative importance of costs of mobility to sector-speciﬁc
experience in explaining the slow adjustment.
6. Analyze the impact of diﬀerent labor market policies on real value added, aggregate
welfare, welfare losses of workers initially employed in the adversely aﬀected sector and on
the speed of adjustment.
The general procedure will be to:
1. Generate a stable economic environment. All the parameters of the model will be
ﬁxed over time, as will the stock of physical capital and the characteristics of the upcoming
generations of workers. Simulate the model long enough so that the distorted-trade steady
state is reached.
2. Shock the economy with a trade liberalization episode. The trade liberalization episode
will consist of a once-and-for-all negative shock in the price of the High-Tech Manufacturing
sector (the import-competing sector) of 30%. This negative shock is interpreted as being
induced by a decrease in the tariﬀs imposed in that sector. The prices of Agriculture/Mining
and of Low-Tech Manufactures will be kept constant but the prices of Non-Tradeables will
adjust endogenously. This is a standard small open economy assumption. The prices of
tradeables are all determined in international markets and the domestic economy is assumed
to be small enough to have no impact on these prices.
3. Analyze the outcome of interest.
The next sub-section goes over some additional features that must be incorporated to
the model when carrying out and analyzing the simulations. These features were irrelevant
in estimation. Appendix D provides the details of how I proceed with the simulations of the
counterfactual experiments. In particular, it explains how the productivity terms and total
stock of physical capital used in the simulations are determined.
276.1 Closing the Model For the Simulations
6.1.1 Capital Owners
Capital owners were not mentioned in the model outline of Section 2. However, I need to
detail their participation in the economy in order to endogenize the price of Non-Tradeables
and to deﬁne welfare. In the experiments, the total stock of physical capital is ﬁxed over
time and hence no investment decisions are modeled.
Capitalists are passive: they receive payments for the rental of their capital and consume.








of consumption, with the same expenditure shares as
















t is the real rental price of capital in sector k.
6.1.2 Market Clearing for Non-Tradeables
In the simulations, the prices of Agriculture/Mining and of Low-Tech Manufacturing will be
kept constant, but the price of Non-Tradeables will adjust endogenously. All Non-Tradeable



























The last equality pins down p4
t as a function of p1
t,p2
t,p3
t. µ4 is the expenditure share on
Non-Tradeables.
6.1.3 Welfare






t . Welfare is hence given by real value added plus the utility of workers in the
Residual Sector minus incurred costs of switching.
Real value added is an incomplete measure of welfare, since it does not take into account
28that workers have a disutility cost in switching sectors and that there are also workers in the
Residual Sector, each enjoying utility w0
i.
6.1.4 Expenditure Shares
Expenditure Shares are calibrated in order to match the average net exports (NX) in the












k  s = 1,...,4 (28)
The shares are presented in Table 12.
6.2 Simulations: Perfect Physical Capital Mobility
For the simulations presented in this sub-section, physical capital is assumed to be perfectly
mobile (eﬃciently allocated) across sectors.
Figure 10 shows the main results of the simulation. All prices are normalized to 1 in the
pre-shock, distorted-trade steady state.
The shock in the price of High-Tech Manufacturing occurs at year 1, when that price
drops from 1 to 0.7. The prices of Agriculture/Mining and Low-Tech Manufacturing are
set to 1 throughout (small open economy assumption). The price of Non-Tradeables is
determined in equilibrium and gradually adjusts to its new steady state value.
Human capital prices in the adversely aﬀected sector drop violently together with the
shock. There are some dynamics on these prices, although most of the transition is accom-
plished in the ﬁrst year.
On the other hand, the adjustment of the labor market is rather sluggish. 80% of the
reallocation out of High-Tech Manufacturing is accomplished after 7 years and 95% of the
reallocation is complete after 13 years. Although sluggish, there is a sizeable adjustment in
the labor market. Employment in High-Tech Manufacturing drops to virtually zero in the
new steady state. The price shock in this sector is big, causing both workers and capital to be
reallocated elsewhere. This extreme result occurs because physical capital is perfectly mobile.
The intuition behind this is that the price in High-Tech drops, driving wages in that sector
down, making some workers leave the sector. With less human capital in the sector, marginal
product of capital decrease, inducing capital to be allocated elsewhere. That decreases wages
further, making additional workers leave, and so on and so forth. Additionally, the costs of
switching into the High-Tech sector are the highest. As long as the human capital prices
29in that sector were high, it was worthwhile for workers to incur the costs and switch there.
However, with declining wages in that sector, many workers leave and fewer enter.
It is worth emphasizing that the long-run magnitude of the impact of the trade shock on
the level of employment in High-Tech is not only driven by the size of the shock, but more
importantly by the extreme assumption regarding capital mobility. A 10% adverse shock in
the price of High-Tech Manufacturing would be enough to drive steady state employment in
that sector from 4.3% to 1.3%, yielding a price elasticity of about 7.
The level of real value added and aggregate welfare are normalized to 1 before the shock.
The long term gain in real value added is of 3.24%, but the economy goes through a signiﬁcant
delay in reaching the new state. 80% of the transition is completed only after 8 years and
95% of the transition is completed only after 14 years. Long term welfare gains are of 1.63%.
The welfare gains are much smaller than the gains in real value added since, every year,
a sizeable portion of the economy chooses the Residual Sector. The value of the Residual
Sector is not aﬀected by prices, and hence this dilutes the gains from liberalization.







) across sectors slightly de-
clines in the long run following the shock, which is the expected direction, since High-Tech
Manufacturing is relatively intensive in skilled workers’ human capital. However, the long
run decrease in the skill premium is very marginal.
6.3 Simulations: No Physical Capital Mobility
Figure 11 shows the dynamics of the labor market following the price shock in High-Tech
Manufacturing when physical capital is immobile. Capital cannot reallocate across sectors.
The perverse spiral that occurs when capital is perfectly mobile is absent here. There
will always be the same amount of capital in High-Tech Manufacturing, so that an exodus
of workers out of that sector can only push human capital prices up, slowing down the ﬂow
of workers out of that sector.
This is the phenomenon we observe in the human capital price ﬁgures. The drop in High-
Tech Manufacturing prices ﬁrst drive real human capital prices down in that sector because
workers are not perfectly mobile. However, the exodus of workers out of the adversely
aﬀected sector pushes human capital prices up. The long run real human capital prices are
quite similar to the pre-shock levels.
Contrary to the case where capital is perfectly mobile, Figure 11 shows that the High-
Tech Manufacturing sector does not die out in the long run. Adjustment of the labor market
is much faster, but the magnitude of adjustment is smaller than with perfect capital mobility.
80% of the reallocation out of High-Tech Manufacturing takes 3 to 4 years and 95% of the
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added after the shock is also reasonably fast. 80% of the transition is completed in the ﬁrst
year. The transition is fully completed after 5 years. Since capital cannot reallocate across
sectors, the gains from the trade shock are rather modest. The long-term gain in real value
added is of 1.22% and the long-term gain in aggregate welfare is of 0.63%.
6.4 Simulations: Imperfect Physical Capital Mobility
In this section, physical capital is assumed to be imperfectly mobile for illustration purposes.
There are many diﬀerent ways to impose frictions on the mobility of physical capital. More-
over, since these frictions were not estimated, assuming numbers for the magnitude of these
frictions is inevitably arbitrary. Consequently, this section should be viewed as an example
of how imperfect physical capital mobility interacts with the labor market in generating slow
transitional dynamics.
I assume that, at each year, 5% at most of each sector’s capital can change hands.
Therefore, physical capital is perfectly mobile in the long run, but not in the short run.
Figure 12 shows the dynamics under this assumption.
In the short run, real human capital prices in High-Tech Manufacturing behave as in an
economy with immobile capital, with an initial fall and subsequent recovery. But in the long
run, as capital ﬂees the adversely aﬀected sector, the economy behaves as it would in an
economy where capital is perfectly mobile.
The adjustment of the labor market is much slower. 80% of the reallocation of High-
Tech Manufacturing is completed only after 25 years. 95% is completed after 55 years. The
duration of the transition in real value added shows similar numbers. The slow mobility of
capital interacts with the labor market amplifying the duration of the transition. Figure
13 compares the employment shares in High-Tech Manufacturing after the shock for the
three diﬀerent assumptions on capital mobility. The transition patterns are very diﬀerent.
As a result, rigorously modeling physical capital mobility together with workers’ barriers to
mobility is a very important direction for future research.
6.5 Adjustment Costs
Table 13 shows welfare losses for workers who were employed in High-Tech Manufacturing
- the adversely aﬀected sector - prior to the adverse price shock, that is at time t = 0.
These are losses in terms of the present value of welfare, which are computed over the
actual transition path and are relative to the welfare path that would have resulted in the
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under diﬀerent assumptions regarding the mobility of physical capital.
Under perfect capital mobility, the welfare losses for the group as a whole is 13.7%. Older
workers (45 to 59 years old in the year before the shock) lose less in terms of welfare than
younger workers (25 to 39 years old in the year before the shock). Moreover, within age
categories, unskilled workers are more adversely aﬀected than skilled workers. Since older
workers are less mobile than younger workers (they have higher costs of mobility), it should
come as a surprise that the latter are more worse oﬀ. However, older workers also have a
higher value of the Residual Sector, and as a result of the adverse shock, drop out of the
formal labor market more frequently than younger workers and wait until they have a good
formal-sector wage oﬀer in order to come back (or for a bad shock in the Residual Sector).
Dropping out of the formal labor market is less of an option for younger workers. Their
value of the Residual Sector is lower and they need to keep accumulating sector-speciﬁc
experience. Thus, they know they will have to come back to the formal labor market soon
and high mobility costs will have to be incurred, making a move to the Residual Sector
relatively less attractive.
Under immobile capital or imperfectly mobile capital, Figures 11 and 12 show that human
capital prices in the adversely aﬀected sector see an immediate drop as a response to the
shock but they also go through a short-run recovery. That explains why workers employed in
High-Tech Manufacturing right before the shock suﬀer smaller losses under these assumptions
for physical capital than under perfect mobility.
I now compute adjustment costs as suggested in Davidson and Matusz (2010). Let
WDT (∞) be the steady state aggregate welfare before the shock (DT standing for distorted
trade) and WFT (∞) the steady state aggregate welfare after the shock (FT standing for free
trade).




(WFT (∞) − WDT (∞)) (29)
However, the transition is similar to the graph depicted in Figure 14 (see the bottom
ﬁgures of Figures 10, 11 and 12). WA is aggregate welfare over the adjustment path at time









The slower the adjustment - the further WA is shifted down and towards the right - the
32larger the adjustment costs.
Table 14.A shows that, under perfect capital mobility, adjustment costs eat up about 16%
of the gains in aggregate welfare and 12% of the gains in real value added. Under imperfect
capital mobility, these numbers are much larger: 32% of aggregate welfare and 27% of real
value added.
Table 14.B shows adjustment costs under no capital mobility. The adjustment of real
value added is quite fast (80% of the adjustment is completed in 1 year) and there is a slight
overshooting with respect to the new steady state value. The adjustment costs in terms of
both real value added and aggregate welfare turn out to be negative due to the short term
overshooting. These measures of welfare peak in the years following the shock and decline
slightly in the long run.
In conclusion, if capital is assumed to be immobile, adjustment costs are low and adjust-
ment is fast. However, the long term gains from trade are half of those when capital can be
reallocated. If capital can be reallocated (either perfect or imperfectly), adjustment costs
become large. An understanding of how these costs might be reduced is important.
6.6 Costs of Mobility Versus Sector-Speciﬁc Experience
Table 4 shows that experience accumulated in High-Tech Manufacturing is, to a certain
degree, transferable to all other sectors. Consequently, since the adversely sector is High-
Tech Manufacturing, one would not expect that sector-speciﬁc experience would be the
most important barrier to mobility for the aﬀected workers.
One possible way to further investigate the relative importance of costs of mobility versus
sector-speciﬁc experience in explaining the slow adjustment of the labor market would be to
completely shut down costs of switching. Subsequently, we would let the economy attain its
new distorted trade steady state, shock the price of High-Tech Manufacturing and compare
the speed of labor market reallocation as compared with the economy with costs of mobility.
This approach ignores the fact that the existence of wage diﬀerentials can itself be a
barrier to mobility - for those workers in sectors paying higher premiums - and that an
economy with smaller costs of mobility will have smaller wage diﬀerentials. Accounting for
this fact, Figure 15 gradually reduces the costs of mobility and looks at how the speed with
which workers leave High-Tech Manufacturing changes. Each line in the graph corresponds
to costs of mobility equal to φ×(Actual Estimated Costs). That is, all individual mobility
costs are reduced by the same percentage given by 1−φ, where φ goes from 1.0 to 0.5. The
reason behind this procedure is that an economy with φ = 1.0 is more comparable to an
economy with φ = 0.9 than to an economy with φ = 0.0, so the idea behind Figure 15 is to
33have a set of two by two comparable economies (although still not perfectly comparable).
The ﬁgure shows that the smaller the mobility costs, the faster is reallocation.
When costs of mobility are reduced to half (φ = 0.5), 80% of the reallocation is completed
after 3 years. This is a major increase in the speed of adjustment as compared to when mobil-
ity costs are incurred in full (φ = 1.0). However, since there is an ex-ante high wage premium
in working in High-Tech Manufacturing, one must keep in mind that faster reallocation with
φ = 0.5 is a result of both smaller costs of mobility and ﬂatter wage diﬀerentials.
Although we cannot decompose the speed of adjustment in three components (mobility
costs, sector-speciﬁc experience and opportunity costs due to wage diﬀerentials), the results
in Figure 15 together with those in Table 4 strongly suggest that mobility costs are the main
component in the slow adjustment of the labor market.
It is important to note that this is not a general statement. The above statement depends
on the fact that the adverse shock aﬀected a sector in which speciﬁc experience is transferable
across sectors.
6.7 Labor Market Policies
I now use the framework developed in this paper in order to analyze the impact some
advocated labor market policies have on the labor market. I focus on the impact of these
policies on costs of adjustment as deﬁned in equation (30), speed of adjustment and on
the welfare of workers in the adversely aﬀected sector (High-Tech Manufacturing). Perfect
mobility of physical capital will be assumed throughout.
The ﬁrst policy consists of a retraining program. The two other policies are two diﬀerent
types of moving subsidies, ﬁnanced with lump sum transfers. In light of the competitive
equilibrium nature of the model and the welfare theorems, the latter cannot be welfare im-
proving, but may have attractive implications for compensation and/or speed of adjustment.
6.7.1 Retraining Program
A retraining program is simulated as follows. Eligible workers face three additional options:
retrain to enter Agriculture/Mining, retrain to enter Low Tech Manufacturing or retrain to
enter Non-Tradeables. Retraining lasts one year, workers are not productive while being
retrained and get w0, the individual value of the Residual Sector. However, after a year of
retraining they enter the sector for which they retrained with 2 additional years of sector-
speciﬁc experience in the chosen sector. In other words, one year of retraining for a sector
is worth two years of sector-speciﬁc experience in that sector, but workers must stay out of
the formal labor market for a year.
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worker decides for retraining in sector s, she incurs the cost of moving into s. However,
after the year spent retraining, she will have access to the sector she retrained to with no
cost. Eligible workers are those employed at High-Tech Manufacturing at year t = 0, right
before the adverse price shock. A worker loses eligibility if and only if she chooses to switch
directly to one of the remaining sectors (without retraining) or once she takes up a retraining
program for any sector. Eligible workers keep their eligibility if they switch to the Residual
Sector.
The retraining program is implemented for 5 years, that is, eligible workers can take up
the retraining program until t = 5, and they are aware of that.
Since we cannot know the cost of the retraining program, I initially assume that it is
costless. The maximum amount a government is going to be willing to pay for it is equal to
the welfare gains it produces.
The upper panel of Figure 16 shows the impact of the retraining program on real value
added. Compared to the "no policy" benchmark, the retraining program reduces real value
added in the ﬁrst 5 years (the duration of the program). However, real value added is higher
after the program expires and until it converges to the "no policy" benchmark. When a
worker chooses to be retrained, it is assumed that she does not produce. This explains the
reduction of real value added with respect to the "no policy" benchmark during the period
when the program is implemented, since many workers are being retrained, and hence are
unproductive. However, in the ﬁrst year after the program expires, all the retrained workers
are productive and the economy has a larger human capital endowment than under the "no
policy" benchmark. Consequently, real value added increases relatively to the "no policy"
benchmark in the years following the end of the program.
On the other hand, Table 16 shows that the retraining program has virtually no impact
on adjustment costs due to this relative decline in real value added in the short run and later
recovery. This result ignores any cost of the retraining program. Therefore, upon introducing
costs of retraining, adjustment costs with respect to real value added will be larger under a
retraining program than under the "no policy" benchmark.
The lower panel of Figure 16 shows that the retraining program increases welfare at
every single point in time. This implies that, if aggregate welfare is the main concern of the
government, there is a range of costs for which the retraining program is welfare-improving.
Adjustment costs are reduced from 16% to 8% under this program (Table 16). Consequently,
if the re-training program costs up to 8% of the frictionless gains from liberalization, the
program is worthwhile to implement. This does not contradict the welfare theorems, since
in that case, transfers are used in order to build additional human capital, improving the
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Figure 17 analyzes the speed with which workers leave the High-Tech Manufacturing
sector, following the shock. The vertical axis shows what percentage of the reallocation out
of that sector is completed at each point in time. The retraining program is successful in
attracting workers out of the declining sector more quickly.
Lastly, Table 15 shows the impact of the retraining program on the losses incurred by
those workers who were employed in High-Tech Manufacturing right before the trade shock
occurred. The program is successful in reducing the losses incurred by older workers, but
less so in compensating younger workers. In the aggregate, trade-induced welfare losses for
these workers are reduced from 13.7% under the "no policy" benchmark to 9.4% under the
retraining program.
6.7.2 Wage moving subsidy of 20%
Under this program, eligible workers receive a 20% increase in the accepted wage, if the
formal sector chosen is not High-Tech Manufacturing. Eligible workers are those employed
in High-Tech Manufacturing at year t = 0, right before the adverse price shock. There is no
subsidy for choosing the Residual Sector. Eligible workers lose eligibility to the subsidy only
when the program expires. The program is ﬁnanced through lump sum taxes. This program
is also implemented for 5 years, and workers are aware of that.
Figure 16 shows that this moving subsidy of 20% is successful in increasing real value
added at each point in time, relatively to the "no policy" benchmark. However, the increase
is rather small. Table 16 shows that its impact on adjustment costs, when welfare is measured
by real value added, is only marginal.
The impact of this program on aggregate welfare, shown in the lower panel of Figure 16,
is also marginal, but negative nontheless. Figure 17 shows that the moving subsidy is able
to accelerate the transition out of the High-Tech Manufacturing, although the retraining
program is slightly more successful in doing so.
Finally, Table 15 shows the impact of the moving subsidy program on the losses incurred
by those workers who were employed in High-Tech Manufacturing right before the trade
shock occurred. The program is somewhat successful in reducing the losses of skilled workers.
However, the program does not adequately compensate the unskilled workers. The overall
welfare compensation is timid when compared to the compensation provided by the retraining
program.
366.7.3 Wage moving subsidy which covers switching costs
Under this program, eligible workers are compensated with the mobility cost they incur
when switching sectors if the destination sector is not the High-Tech Manufacturing sector.
Eligible workers are those employed in High-Tech Manufacturing at year t = 0, right before
the adverse price shock. Eligibility is lost after a worker is compensated once or after
the program expires. If an eligible worker switches to the Residual Sector, she does not
lose eligibility. Because workers are compensated with the mobility costs they incur when
switching, this policy is labeled "Zero Costs". The program is ﬁnanced through lump-sum
taxes. As the other two programs, the "Zero Costs" subsidy program is implemented for 5
years.
The upper panel of Figure 16 shows the impact of the "Zero Costs" program on real value
added. Among the three policies analyzed in this paper, it is the one with the unambiguously
worst impact on real value added. It gives incentives for eligible workers with good draws in
the value of the Residual Sector to drop out of the labor market, retaining eligibility to later
move to the formal sector without incurring switching costs. This reduces production during
the implementation of the program. Table 16 shows that adjustment costs as measured by
real value added increase to 17% with this policy.
The lower panel of Figure 16 shows the impact of this program on aggregate welfare.
Apart from the ﬁrst year of the program, aggregate welfare is substantially reduced by this
intervention. As mentioned earlier, this policy gives incentives for workers to drop out of
the formal labor market during the implementation of the program and eventually use the
subsidy in order to re-access the formal labor market, incurring large switching costs, which
must be incurred by the economy. Aggregate welfare sees its lowest level at t = 5, the
last year of the program implementation. At this point, a mass of eligible workers initially
located at the Residual Sector return to the formal labor market, incurring large mobility
costs. Table 16 shows that adjustment costs, when measured with respect to aggregate
welfare, jump from 16% to 22%.
The decline in welfare under this policy is not surprising, in light of the welfare theorems.
There is only room for this policy to better compensate the losers and/or to speed up
adjustment. Indeed, Table 15 shows that this is the policy that best compensates those
employed in High Tech Manufacturing right before the shock. Instead of suﬀering 13.7%
welfare losses under the "no policy" benchmark, under the "Zero Costs" policy, these workers
suﬀer aggregate losses of only 3.7%. Older workers especially beneﬁt, and actually see gains.
Lastly, Figure 17 shows that the "Zero Costs" induces faster transition out of High-Tech
Manufacturing. However, there is a larger fraction of workers moving to the Residual Sector
ﬁrst (later they will be able to have access to the formal labor market without incurring
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6.7.4 Conclusion
None of the three simulated policies are able to reduce adjustment costs, when these are
measured with respect to real value added. However, the only policy that has the ability
to increase aggregate welfare and hence reduce welfare adjustment costs (when these are
measured in terms of aggregate welfare) is the retraining program. This is intuitive given
the competitive equilibrium nature of the model, the welfare theorems and the fact that the
other two policies are purely redistribution programs.
Nevertheless, the policy that best compensates the losers is the "Zero Costs" program.
However, this comes at the expense of substantially larger adjustment costs, both in terms
of real value added and in terms of aggregate welfare. That said, the retraining program
also has a good compensation eﬀect.
6.8 Discussion
A striking feature of the experiments conducted in this section is that although labor ad-
justment is slow, there is a large labor market response after the adverse price shock in the
High-Tech Manufacturing sector. The speed and magnitude of the adjustment depends on
the exact assumptions regarding the mobility of physical capital, but even under the extreme
assumption of no capital mobility, the elasticity of employment in High-Tech Manufacturing
with respect to its price is reasonably high.
One might think that the adverse price shock that was simulated was too large, and that
this accounts for the large movements in the labor market. For this reason, Table 17 shows
the long-run employment and wage elasticities in High-Tech Manufacturing following a 10%
adverse shock, in addition to the 30% adverse shock in its price. The elasticities are reported
under both perfect capital mobility and under no capital mobility (ﬁxed capital).
Under perfect capital mobility, a 10% adverse shock in the price of the High-Tech
Manufacturing sector produces a long-run reduction of 70% in employment in that sector,
yielding a price elasticity of 7. The elasticity of wages with respect to prices is approximately
1.3, which is stable across skill groups and does not depend on the size of the shock. Finally,
under the perfect capital mobility assumption, labor market responses are large, irrespective
of the magnitude of the shock.
Under ﬁxed capital, the elasticities are stable and do not depend much on the magnitude
of the shock. The employment price elasticity is in the region of 1.3 and the wage elasticity
varies between 0.12 and 0.17, according to the skill group and size of the shock. These
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response of the labor market with respect to a trade liberalization episode. Additionally,
these numbers are remarkably in line with the long-run elasticities obtained by Revenga
(1992) using data from the US. She ﬁnds that her long period (5 years) price elasticities for
employment and wage are given by 1.74 and 0.40, respectively.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) survey empirical studies on inter-sectoral reallocation fol-
lowing trade reform in developing countries and conclude that the available evidence points
towards very little inter-sectoral reallocation. The lack of inter-sectoral reallocation in devel-
oping countries may be reconciled with the results obtained within the framework presented
in this paper (and with the results in Revenga (1992)) with small pass-through from tariﬀs
to domestic prices (e.g., with imperfect competition in product markets), faster productivity
growth in the adversely aﬀected sectors, high share of sector-speciﬁc and non-transferable
physical capital, many forms of government subsidies towards the aﬀected sectors, or a com-
bination of all of these.
7 Concluding Remarks, Extensions and Future Work
This paper studies the short-to medium-run response of the labor market to trade-induced
sectoral price changes. Within the framework presented, the paper assesses the distributional
and welfare implications of the slow labor market adjustment. The framework also allows for
the analysis of the performance of diﬀerent labor market policies with the aim of reducing
adjustment costs, compensating losers and/or speeding up adjustment.
First, I estimated a structural dynamic equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market
based on the framework of Lee (2005) and Lee and Wolpin (2006). The model features a
multi-sector economy with overlapping generations, heterogeneous workers in several dimen-
sions who have comparative advantage across sectors, endogenous accumulation of sector-
speciﬁc experience and costly switching of sectors.
The model’s estimates point toward large workers’ costs of switching sectors. Never-
theless, the distribution of these costs has a high dispersion within the population. The
dispersion of mobility costs is only due to workers’ observable characteristics such as gen-
der, education and age. Older and less-educated workers face substantially higher costs of
switching sectors. Moreover, in line with previous research by Neal (1995), this paper ﬁnds
that sector-speciﬁc experience is imperfectly transferable across sectors, leading to additional
barriers to mobility.
Second, the estimated model was used as a laboratory for counterfactual experiments.
The ﬁndings indicate that: (1) there is a large response of the labor market following trade
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the transition are very sensitive to assumptions regarding the mobility of physical capital;
(3) workers employed in High-Tech Manufacturing right before the shock face substantial
losses in welfare, especially the unskilled and the young; (4) adjustment costs - deﬁned
as the fraction of the potential gains from trade that are lost due to the slow and costly
adjustment - are signiﬁcant; (5) costs of mobility are more important than sector-speciﬁc
experience in explaining the slow adjustment of the labor market, at least when the shock
aﬀects the High-Tech Manufacturing sector; (6) retraining workers initially employed in the
adversely aﬀected sector reduces welfare losses incurred by these workers and may increase
aggregate welfare; and (7) a moving subsidy that covers switching costs is more promising
in compensating workers initially employed in the aﬀected sector, although at the expense
of much higher adjustment costs.
The analyses conducted in this paper highlight the importance of modeling physical capi-
tal mobility together with labor mobility. The magnitudes of the size and speed of adjustment
of the labor market depend crucially on assumptions regarding physical capital mobility. Es-
timating a model with imperfect mobility of both capital and labor is an important avenue
for future work.
The current framework does not incorporate permanent unobserved heterogeneity in
wages. This may be an important ingredient if comparative advantage across sectors has a
permanent unobservable component. The standard way to model this permanent unobserv-
able heterogeneity in the structural Labor Economics literature is to assume the economy
has H types of individuals with diﬀerent patterns of comparative advantage across sectors,
but these are unobservable to the econometrician. The introduction of these permanent
unobservable components introduces an initial conditions problem: the initial conditions are
endogenous and depend on the type of the individual. In other words, the initial condi-
tions on the sector-speciﬁc experience variables carry important information on the type of
each individual, and this must be taken into account in the estimation procedure. Follow-
ing Wooldridge (2005), we could model the distribution of types conditioned on the initial
conditions. The diﬃculty associated with this route is that it introduces a number of addi-
tional parameters to the model, the interpretation of which is not trivial. The optimization
process becomes much more cumbersome and computational time considerably grows. I am
currently estimating such a model.
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Table 1: Correspondence Between 2-digit NAICS Industries and The Four Aggregate Sectors
Agriculture/Mining Agriculture; Forestry; Fishing; Mineral Coal Extraction; Oil Ex-
traction; Metallic; Minerals Extraction; Non-Metallic Minerals
Extraction
Low-Tech Manufacturing Food and Beverage; Tobacco Products; Textiles; Apparel; Leather
Products and Footwear; Wood Products; Paper; Cellulose; Paper
Products; Editing and Printing; Rubber and Plastic Products;
Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; Fabricated Metal
Products (except machinery and equipment); Furniture; Recy-
cling
High-Tech Manufacturing Alcohol Production; Nuclear Fuels; Oil Reﬁning; Coke; Chemi-
cal Products; Machinery and Equipment; Oﬃce, Accounting and
Computing Machinery; Electrical Machinery and Apparatus; Ra-
dio, Television and Communications Equipment; Medical, Preci-
sion and Optical Instruments; Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-
Trailers; Other Transportation Equipment
Non-Tradeables All other industries, including Utilities, Trade, Transportation,
Construction, Government, Services






44Table 3: Average Transition Rates (in %) 1995 to 2005
Residual Agriculture/Mining Low-Tech High-Tech Non-Tradeables
Residual 79.50 1.69 2.79 0.59 15.43
Agriculture/Mining 17.33 75.98 2.26 0.54 3.89
Low-Tech 13.91 0.80 79.35 0.78 5.16
High-Tech 10.48 0.60 2.25 81.26 5.40
Non-Tradeables 12.25 0.26 0.88 0.31 86.31
Table 4: Human Capital Production Functions: Parameter Estimates
Agr/Mining LT Manufacturing HT Manufacturing Non-Tradeables
Female -0.3407 -0.2435 -0.4188 -0.2352
(0.0079) (0.0040) (0.0103) (0.0026)
I(Educ = 2) 0.0226 0.2741 0.1793 0.2942
(0.0079) (0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0035)
I(Educ = 4) 0.9679 0.8057 0.7929 0.8697
(0.0117) (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0037)
(age − 25) 0.0341 0.0359 0.0414 0.0249
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0005)
(age − 25)
2 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0005
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00001)
Exper1 0.1501 0.0920 -0.1141 0.0261
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0108) (0.0028)
Exper2 0.0210 0.1176 0.0101 0.0357
(0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0011)
Exper3 0.0766 0.0876 0.1067 0.0642
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Exper4 0.0292 0.0624 0.0029 0.1041
(0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0004)
SD of Shock 0.5510 0.5451 0.5472 0.7013
(0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0032)
Standard errors in parenthesis





I(Educ = 2) 0.3003
(0.0116)
I(Educ = 3) 0.5723
(0.0107)
I(Educ = 4) 1.7722
(0.0107)
(age − 25) 0.0140
(0.0009)
(age − 25)2 -0.0001
(0.00003)
SD of Shock 20.6143
(0.1483)
Standard errors in parenthesis
46Table 6: Costs of Mobility: Parameter Estimates
Agr/Mining From Residual 3.1940
(0.0036)
LT Manuf From Residual 3.2131
(0.0048)
HT Manuf From Residual 3.4233
(0.0047)
Non-Tradeables From Residual 3.1894
(0.0050)
Agr/Mining From Formal 0.7641
(0.0454)
LT Manuf From Formal 1.5450
(0.0221)
HT Manuf From Formal 2.2859
(0.0252)




I(Educ = 2) 0.0733
(0.0060)
I(Educ = 3) 0.1976
(0.0065)
I(Educ = 4) 0.5108
(0.0086)
(age − 25) 0.0278
(0.0009)
(age − 25)2 -0.0005
(0.00003)
Standard errors in parenthesis
47Table 7: Median Costs of Mobility
In Terms of Conditional In Terms of the Value of
Average Annual Wages Staying in the Current Sector
To: from Formal Sector from Residual sector from Formal Sector from Residual Sector
Agr/Mining 0.68 11.41 0.03 0.41
LT Manuf 1.50 11.63 0.06 0.42
HT Manuf 3.25 14.35 0.13 0.51
Non-Tradeables 2.15 11.35 0.08 0.41
Table 8: Correlates of Mobility Costs When Expressed in Terms of Annual Average Wages
Log Cost into Log Cost into Log Cost into Log Cost into
Agr/Min LT Manuf HT Manuf Non-Tradeables
Female 0.42712 0.41565 0.40451 0.44535
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
I(Educ = 2) -0.16656 -0.20033 -0.19162 -0.25618
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
I(Educ = 3) -0.49028 -0.52698 -0.51788 -0.61914
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
I(Educ = 4) -1.05216 -1.08600 -1.07986 -1.22926
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
(Age − 25) -0.01894 -0.01948 -0.01724 -0.01929
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Age − 25)2 0.00046 0.00047 0.00041 0.00054
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.06647 0.75952 1.50190 1.01645
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 202234 184633 204193 50661
R2 0.715 0.710 0.734 0.641
Standard errors in parenthesis
Note: Regressions estimated using a random sample of 50,000 individuals over 1995 to 2005.
48Table 9: Wages 1995-2005: Data vs. Model
A. Average Hourly Wage (2005 R$) 1995-2005
Sector Data Model
Agriculture/Mining 3.93 3.89
LT Manuf 5.76 5.72
HT Manuf 11.64 11.91
Non-Tradeables 8.18 8.16
B. Average Log Hourly Wage (2005 R$) 1995-2005
Sector Data Model
Agriculture/Mining 0.96 1.00
LT Manuf 1.37 1.42
HT Manuf 2.03 2.16
Non-Tradeables 1.58 1.61




LT Manuf 8.43 8.30
HT Manuf 2.71 2.58
Non-Tradeables 46.48 45.27
49Table 11: Transition Rates (%) 1995-2005: Data vs. Model
A. Data
Residual Agr/Min LT Manuf HT Manuf Non-Tradeables
Residual 79.50 1.69 2.79 0.59 15.43
Agriculture/Mining 17.33 75.98 2.26 0.54 3.89
LT Manuf 13.91 0.80 79.35 0.78 5.16
HT Manuf 10.48 0.60 2.25 81.26 5.40
Non-Tradeables 12.25 0.26 0.88 0.31 86.31
B. Model
Residual Agr/Min LT Manuf HT Manuf Non-Tradeables
Residual 79.65 1.54 2.89 0.40 15.53
Agriculture/Mining 18.19 77.63 1.65 0.19 2.34
LT Manuf 16.28 0.50 79.88 0.33 3.01
HT Manuf 9.54 0.32 1.00 85.54 3.61
Non-Tradeables 13.58 0.21 0.54 0.23 85.44





Table 13: Welfare Changes (in %) of Workers Who Were Employed in HT Manufacturing The
Year Before The Shock
Perfect Capital Mobility No Capital Mobility Imperfect Capital Mobility
Overall -13.7 -5.3 -8.0
By Demographics
Old / Unskilled -12.3 -3.4 -5.7
Old / Skilled -9.4 -4.4 -5.7
Young / Unskilled -15.6 -4.9 -8.2
Young / Skilled -14.1 -6.0 -8.8
50Table 14: Adjustment Costs
A. Adjustment Costs with Perfect and Imperfect Capital Mobility
Long Term Adj. Cost w/ Perfect Adj. Cost w/ Imperfect
Gain (%) Capital Mobility (%) Capital Mobility (%)
Real Value Added 3.24 11.77 27.29
Welfare 1.63 15.78 31.94
B. Adjustment Costs with No Capital Mobility
Long Term Adj. Cost w/
Gain (%) No Capital Mobility (%)
Real Value Added 1.22 -10.98
Welfare 0.63 -4.50
Table 15: Welfare Changes (in %) of Workers Who Were Employed in HT Manufacturing The
Year Before The Shock - Comparison of Diﬀerent Labor Market Policies
(Under Perfect Capital Mobility)
No Policy Retraining Subsidy Zero Costs
Overall -13.7 -9.4 -11.7 -3.7
By Demographics
Old / Unskilled -12.3 -2.8 -10.9 10.5
Old / Skilled -9.4 -1.1 -4.9 3.5
Young / Unskilled -15.6 -9.3 -15.3 -2.4
Young / Skilled -14.1 -11.5 -10.7 -6.5
51Table 16: Adjustment Costs Under Diﬀerent Labor Market Policies and Perfect Capital Mobility
Long-Term Adjustment Costs %
Gain (%) No Policy Retraining Subsidy Zero Costs
Real Value Added 3.24 11.77 11.79 11.16 16.57
Welfare 1.63 15.78 8.40 16.28 22.35
Table 17: Long Run Elasticities of Employment and Wages in High-Tech Manufacturing
Perfect Capital Mobility Fixed Capital
Magnitude of the Adverse Shock 10% 30% 10% 30%
Employment 7.04 3.26 1.34 1.35
Human Capital Price - Unskilled 1.25 1.28 0.12 0.14
Human Capital Price - Skilled 1.26 1.33 0.15 0.17
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Figure 1: Evolution of employment shares 1995 to 2005 (Non-Tradeables: Right Axis)













Agr/Mining LT Manuf HT Manuf Non−Tradeables
Figure 2: Relative changes in employment shares with respect to 1995.
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Agr/Mining LT Manuf HT Manuf Non−Tradeables
Figure 3: Evolution of wage diﬀerentials, 1995 to 2005
54Figure 4: Estimation procedure
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Figure 6: Nonparametric density plots of mobility costs expressed in terms of annual average
wages. Costs of mobility vary according to the sector of destination and whether a worker is located
in the formal sector or the Residual Sector. Costs also depend on workers’ characteristics, the
distribution of which is extracted from the data.
57Figure 7: Goodness of Fit - Log Wage Regressions. The vertical axis displays the conditional log
wage moments in the data. The horizontal axis displays the conditional log wage moments predicted
by the model. The distribution of the conditioning variables is extracted from the data. A perfect
model ﬁt would lead to all the points over the 45◦ line.
Figure 8: Goodness of Fit - Sectoral Choice Regressions. The vertical axis displays the conditional
choice moments in the data. The horizontal axis displays the conditional choice moments predicted
by the model. The distribution of the conditioning variables is extracted from the data. A perfect
model ﬁt would lead to all the points over the 45◦ line.
58Figure 9: Goodness of Fit - Transition Rates Regressions. The vertical axis displays the conditional
transition moments in the data. The horizontal axis displays the conditional transition moments
predicted by the model. The distribution of the conditioning variables is extracted from the data.
A perfect model ﬁt would lead to all the points over the 45◦ line.






























































































































































Figure 10: Dynamics under Perfect Capital Mobility following the adverse price shock in the
High-Tech Manufacturing sector illustrated in the left-upper panel. The price in the Non-Tradeables
sector adjusts in equilibrium. The evolution of human capital prices, employment shares, real value
added and aggregate welfare following the shock are subsequently displayed in that order.



































































































































































Figure 11: Dynamics under No Capital Mobility following the adverse price shock in the High-
Tech Manufacturing sector illustrated in the left-upper panel. The price in the Non-Tradeables
sector adjusts in equilibrium. The evolution of human capital prices, employment shares, real value
added and aggregate welfare following the shock are subsequently displayed in that order.






























































































































































Figure 12: Dynamics under Imperfect Capital Mobility following the adverse price shock in the
High-Tech Manufacturing sector illustrated in the left-upper panel. The price in the Non-Tradeables
sector adjusts in equilibrium. The evolution of human capital prices, employment shares, real value
added and aggregate welfare following the shock are subsequently displayed in that order.


















Figure 13: Evolution of employment shares in the HT Manufacturing sector following the adverse
price shock and under the diﬀerent assumptions regarding capital mobility
Figure 14: Slow and Gradual Adjustment of Welfare WA From The Distorted Trade level WDT(∞)
to the Free Trade Steady State level WFT(∞)












































Figure 15: Reallocation speed out of the HT Manufacturing sector following the adverse price
shock for diﬀerent levels of mobility costs. Perfect Capital Mobility is assumed.

































Figure 16: Welfare dynamics following the price shock under the diﬀerent labor market policies.
Perfect Capital Mobility is assumed.










































Figure 17: Reallocation speed out of the HT Manufacturing sector following the adverse price
shock under the diﬀerent labor market policies. Perfect Capital Mobility is assumed.
66A Appendix - Solving The Bellman Equation
Given a parameter set Θ that parametrizes the economy described in Section 2, the distribu-
tion of initial conditions across the population, and real value added series for each sector, we
can simulate individual choices and compute the sector-speciﬁc equilibrium human capital
prices as described in Section 2.3.
The parameter set Θ includes the parameters of the value added functions (1), human
capital production functions (7), idiosyncratic shocks’ variances, mobility costs functions (9)
and discount factor.
The distribution of initial conditions is given by the joint distribution of gender, educa-
tion, age and sector-speciﬁc experiences as found in the data in the ﬁrst sample period, 1995.
From 1996 onwards, I need to include the initial conditions of entering generations (those
who are 25 years old) and keep track of the decisions generated by the model of the older
generations.
In order to simulate the individual decisions for the parameter set Θ, I must ﬁrst solve the
Bellman equation given by (11)-(12). The Bellman equation is solved by backward recursion,
starting at the terminal age A = 60 and going back until the initial age of 25 is reached. Some
diﬃculties arise in the solution of (11)-(12). First, in order to compute expectations, I must
integrate the value function - which is a nonlinear function of the state space variables - with
respect to the idiosyncratic shocks. Such multidimensional integrals do not have a closed













are included in the state space and these are continuous variables.
Consequently, I have a large state space with continuous variables.
In order to deal with these problems in a way that still makes estimation feasible, I
approximate the solution of the Bellman equation using similar methods as in Keane and
Wolpin (1994).
Consider a worker with gender g and education level e. That worker has accumulated
sector-speciﬁc experience in each sector given by the vector exper and human capital prices
for her skill level are given by the vector r. In addition, suppose this worker has age a and
chose sector s last period. Let EMAXa (g,e,exper,r,s) denote the expected value this
worker gets at age a, before the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed and before the age a choice
is made. EMAXa (.) stands for the expectation of Va (.), the left hand side object in (12),














s ≤ 9 ; r ≤ r
s ≤ r
 
67r and r are lower and upper bounds for prices of human capital. For each age a, gender
g, education level e and sector s, I approximate EMAXa (g,e,.,s), deﬁned on ∆ with the
following backward recursion procedure.
Repeat the following algorithm for all g ∈ {Male,Female}, e ∈ {1,2,3,4} and s ∈
{0,1,2,3,4}.





For each n, approximate EMAXA (g,e,δ
n,s) drawing idiosyncratic shocks ε and using
Monte Carlo integration.
2) Approximate EMAXA (g,e,.,s) by ﬁtting a complete second-order polynomial regres-






r1,nI (r1,n > c1),...,r4,nI (r4,n > c4)
 
3) Use equations (11)-(12) and repeat this procedure for a = A − 1,...,26.
Ideally, c1,...,cS should be chosen so as to obtain the best possible ﬁt, but in this paper,
I set cs =
rs+rs
2 in order to save computational time. I get, nevertheless, very good ﬁt for
the polynomial regressions (R2 > 0.99 for all g, e and s).
B Appendix - Standard Errors
The Indirect Inference estimator is deﬁned by:
  Θ = argmin
Θ
 





  δ −   δ
S (Θ)
 
Where   Ω is a positive deﬁnite matrix with Ω = plim   Ω
Since the model is assumed to be correctly speciﬁed:
δ0 ≡ plim  δ = δ (Θ0)
Deﬁne
  g
S (Θ) ≡   δ −   δ
S (Θ)
  g
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can be computed using the GMM equations that deﬁne   δ, the size of







will be computed by bootstrap.




  δS (Θ0)
 
can also be computed
by bootstrap with the original data. The procedure is as follows: 1) extract 1000 individuals
per generation and skill level from 1995 to 2005. 2) Repeatedly draw these individuals with
replacement. 3) For each drawn sample j, ﬁt   δj = (Xj′WXj)
−1 Xj′WY j, where W is a
weighting matrix that corrects for the sampling scheme.
B.1 Weighting Matrix
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B.2 Computation of G0
1) For each component n of Θ, sample 20 points   Θ + εnen, where |εn| is small and compute
  δS
 
  Θ + εnen
 
.








  Θn + εn
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by looking at the derivative of the polynomial at
  Θn.
C Appendix - Goodness of Fit
This appendix examines how the model performs relative to moments which were not im-
posed during the estimation. Three additional classes of moments are analyzed.
First, Figure C.18 shows three-year history transition rates in the data and in the sim-
ulated model. A three-year transition history between years t and t + 2 consists of chosen
sectors s(t), s(t + 1) and s(t + 2). Each bullet in Figure C.18 represents the fraction of the
population who switched from sector s(t) to sector s(t + 1) and then s(t + 2), conditional
on s(t) and averaged out throughout the sample period. For example, a bullet can represent
the transition 3 → 0 → 4, which means a transition from High-Tech Manufacturing to the
Residual Sector and then to Non-Tradeables. However, the transition rate is conditional on
starting at High-Tech Manufacturing. The transition rate for 3 → 0 → 4 should be read
as: among those workers whose sector of origin is 3, 1.4% / 1.5% (data / model) of them
followed the 0 → 4 path in the subsequent years.































Figure C.18: Three-year history transition rates as predicted by the simulated model vs. actual
rates in the data.
Second, Figure C.19 shows the frequency of switching for those individuals who are
present in each of the 11 years of the sample (those who are 25-to 50-years-old in 1995). It
71compares the frequencies of switching in the data with the ones predicted by simulating the
model.




























Figure C.19: Histogram for the number of times individuals switched sectors. Population: in-
dividuals always present in the sample period (25 to 50 years old in 1995). Simulated model vs.
Actual Data.
Third, Figure C.20 shows histograms for the number of years individuals present in each
year of the sample chose each sector. For example, in the upper-left sub-ﬁgure the model
predicts that 10% of this population spent exactly 1 period in the Residual Sector whereas
7% of this population has actually spent exactly 1 year in the Residual Sector.
Overall, Figures C.18, C.19 and C.20 show that the model performs well in matching
those three sets of moments, even though they were not imposed in the estimation.












































































































































































































Figure C.20: Histograms for number of years spent in each sector. Population: individuals always
present in the sample period (25 to 50 years old in 1995). Simulated Model vs. Actual Data
D Appendix - Steady State
The economy is simulated as follows:
1. The productivity terms zs
t ≡ ps
tAs
t (s = 1,...,4) are recovered for t = 2005, the last
period in the sample. In order to do that, we need to make an assumption on how physical
capital is allocated. Since the economy-wide rental price of capital is what we can recover
73from the data, I assume eﬃcient allocation, that is, marginal product of physical capital
















































Where   Θ is the vector of estimated parameters.
2. Initially set As
2005 = zs
2005 (s = 1,...,4). Prices of all sectors (except Non-Tradeables)
are set to 1 in 2005 and throughout the simulation. The price of Non-Tradeables is deter-
mined in equilibrium.
For the simulations, As
t = As
2005 (s = 1,...,4) for all t, productivity will be ﬁxed over
time. Analogously, the human capital shares will be ﬁxed at their 2005 value.
3. Entering generations all look alike. The distribution of gender and education is given
by the distribution of the cohort born in 1980 (last generation to enter the estimation, in
2005). The new generations enter the simulation with zero experience.
4. As a result of the previous step, the composition of the population will change as
compared to 2005, since the entering generations will look diﬀerent from the entering gen-
erations used in estimation. In particular, they will be more educated (the 1980 cohort is
more educated than, say, the 1960 cohort). Consequently, the simulated economy will be
richer in human capital than the economy used in estimation. I allow for the capital stock
to accompany the growth in human capital. Hence, the economy-wide rental price of capital
will be ﬁxed to rK
2005 and the capital stock will be determined so that the marginal product
of capital in each sector equals rK
2005. Simulate this economy until the economy reaches a
steady state. After the steady state is reached, the capital stock is ﬁxed at the steady state
level.
5. The steady state price for Non-Tradeables is then normalized to 1. The value of A4
t is
reset so that z4
t satisﬁes (27).
6. Once the steady state is reached, the economy is shocked with a once-and-for-all tariﬀ
reduction that decreases the domestic price of High-Tech Manufacturing by 30%. That is,
the new domestic price of High-Tech Manufacturing is now of 0.7 and persists forever.
7. Price of Non-Tradeables and physical rental prices adjust endogenously to the shock.
How the latter will adjust will depend on the assumptions made regarding the mobility of
74physical capital.
75